What Make India Fear of CHINA / World War 3 Full Documentary-2017
Not long ago, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had an apparently successful visit to the People’s Republic of China. In a rare departure from protocol, Chinese President Xi Jinping didn’t receive Modi in Beijing, but his hometown of Xi’an. The highest level of reception was accorded to the Indian prime minister.
On his part, Modi was surprisingly candid. He asserted that there was a need for China to reconsider its approach on some of the issues that hold the two countries back from realizing the full potential of their partnership. As good hosts, the Chinese listened — but like the great terracotta warriors of Xi’an, they stood silent, firm, and resolute.
This was reflected in China’s recent white paper on defense, where India does not figure at all. White papers articulate a state’s threat perception and military response. China has signaled that India is a minor matter and not worthy of too much thought.
China’s Growing Military Capabilities
This contempt for India is backed by China’s rapid strides in military capability. The Chinese navy has been increasingly assertive in India’s littoral — including port visits to Sri Lanka by its nuclear submarines and, more recently, one to Pakistan by a conventional submarine.
Similarly, the PLA Air Force now routinely flies several more sorties in Tibet. The PLAAF is at a relative load disadvantage as fighter aircraft performance, especially the capability to carry payload, is down by up to 50 percent when taking off from Tibetan airf
Finally, the militaries of China and Pakistan are working in ever-increasing coordination through high level exchanges, military exercises, and drills. Such cooperation is critical in modern warfare — it sharpens joint operation capabilities and makes a two-pronged offensive against India possible. In military terms, capability while its intentions remain as aggressive as ever.
When it comes to the long-standing border dispute, India wants to clarify the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China. China has shown disdain for these proposals. As far as China is concerned, this is not the time to clarify the LAC in the Ladakh sector; in a rare official comment, a mid-ranking Chinese official recently ruled out any such demarcation. Despite efforts at a summit level meeting, where Modi boldly invested a great deal political capital on this public platform, China has chosen to ignore Indian suggestions that marked borders are secure borders. India has drawn a blank on any forward movement on the border issue since China prefers not to be drawn into any cartographic commitments.
The pattern is played out in China’s determination to build the $45 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). A large part of the project will pass through areas in Kashmir that India considers its own territory. China is already undertaking feasibility surveys, which involve PLAs troops in significant numbers. In pursuing the project — seen by many as over-ambitious and wasteful — China has signaled that it does not take India’s claim on Pakistan-occupied Kashmir at all seriously.
India’s Options
Confronting a powerful and aggressive China is a difficult task. Diplomatically, India is doing some things right, such as reaching out to neighbors like Bangladesh and the countries of Central Asia. However the true ace up India’s sleeve is greater cooperation between maritime democracies. The United States, Japan, and Australia are natural partners.
Here, alas, India has vacillated, for example hesitating to invite Japan to join the large scale Malabar maritime exercises. India must give up this fear of upsetting China. China certainly has no concerns about upsetting India in cozying up to Pakistan – a partnership that included sharing a nuclear bomb design. India must fully embrace the strategic scope of maritime diplomacy. Going ahead with the trilateral naval exercise is a start.
The other immediate task for India is to beef up its armed forces. This is a tougher ask. India is short on weapons, ammunition, aircraft, missiles, and almost everything else. A decisive push in policy, even if it calls for short term imports, is critical to play catch-up. A viable military posture is the need of the hour. The purchase of the Rafale aircraft is a step in that direction. India also needs to speed up its warship building efforts, which are running half a decade behind schedule.
When confronting a seemingly-hostile China, being militarily prepared will give some confidence to India’s diplomatic initiative. India’s ballistic missile program is crucial here, particularly the operational deployment of missiles on a nuclear submarine. A fully operational triad will give India more leverage in dealing with a belligerent China.
Modi’s much talked about selfie with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang was an interesting soft power gambit. However, going toe-to-toe
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